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Docket No. 890033-CA

ROBERT FRANK LAW,

:

Priority No. 14(b)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
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M. LYNNE LARSON,
Intervenor/Appellant.

:
:
:
--- oooOooo—PARTIES

All parties to this action appear in the caption of this Brief.

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(h), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from an Order entered by the District Court that
dismissed Appellant M. Lynne Larson's Complaint in Intervention in this matter.
Appellant Larson sought to intervene in a garnishment action that had been initiated
by Respondent Carrie Jo Law to enforce a judgment entered in her favor against

Robert Law, her former husband, for monies owed, but not paid, pursuant to a
Decree of Divorce. Respondent's Amended Complaint in Intervention alleges she
is entitled to the funds to be garnished either as the true owner of those funds or as
the beneficiary of a resulting trust.

ISSUES
Respondent accepts Appellant's Statement of Issues. (App. Br. at 2.)

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The determinative statutory authority is set forth in Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended) as follows:
61-2-10. Restriction on commissions - Affiliation with
more than one broker.
It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent
to accept valuable consideration for the performance of
any of the acts specified in this chapter from any person
except the principal broker with whom he is affiliated
and licensed. An inactive licensee is not authorized to
conduct real estate transactions until he becomes
affiliated with a licensed principal broker. No sales
agent or associate broker may affiliate with more than
one principal broker at the same time. Except as
provided by rule, a principal broker may not be
responsible for more than one real estate brokerage at
the same time.
61-2-18. Actions for recovery of compensation restricted.
(1)
No person may bring or maintain an action in
any court of this state for the recovery of a commission,
fee, or compensation for any act done or service
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to other
2

than licensed principal brokers, unless the person was
duly licensed as a principal broker at the time of the act
or rendering the service.
(2)
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in
his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or
compensation for services as a sales agent or associate
broker unless the action is against the principal broker
with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the
recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation
may only be instituted and brought by the principal
broker with whom the sales agent or associate broker is
affiliated.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The chronology of events set forth in the "Statement of the Case"
section of Appellant's brief is undisputed. For the purposes of the motion before
the District Court and this appeal only, all facts set forth in Intervenor's Amended
Complaint in Intervention and in her Affidavit may be considered as true.
Respondent's former husband, Robert Law, is a licensed real estate
broker doing business as Acres West Real Estate. (Complaint in Intervention at f 2,
reproduced in Addendum at A-3.) Intervenor Lynne Larson is a licensed real estate
sales associate, or agent, affiliated with Acres West Real Estate. Id.
Respondent Carrie Jo Law sought to enforce her judgment against
Robert Law, obtained April 27, 1988, through Writs of Execution served on several
title companies through which Robert Law was believed to be doing business as a
real estate broker. (R. at 100-122.) Some of the funds due Robert Law as broker
resulted from sales for which Appellant Larson was responsible and, accordingly, will
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be due a commission from Robert Law. (Larson Affidavit, reproduced in Addendum
at A-2.) The funds at issue are being held by the garnishee title companies.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Order entered by the District Court is correct and is supported
by both

the undisputed

facts

and the law.

The facts

upon which

Intervenor/Appellant bases her claim are not disputed and, upon those facts, her
claim must fail Appellant Larson has no legal claim to commissions against any
person or entity except her broker. Both relevant statutes and well-established
agency law preclude Intervenor's recovery.

ARGUMENT
POINT Is APPELLANT/INTERVENOR HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY
FACTUAL DISPUTE WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE LOWER COURT'S
SUMMARY DISPOSITION,
Whether the Court ruled on this matter as a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b) or as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court recognized that there was no factual dispute as
to the basis of the Intervenor's alleged claims. She is a real estate agent who sold
some properties. Defendant Robert Law is her broker. Respondent Carrie Jo Law
has validly garnished funds payable to Robert Law held by several title companies.
Some of these funds resulted from sales arranged by Intervenor.
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The question is not a factual one. It is a legal one: under these
undisputed facts, which party is legally entitled to the money? The District Court,
presented with these facts, correctly ruled in favor of Plaintiff/Respondent Carrie Jo
LaWe A thorough review of her Brief reveals that Intervenor has failed to raise any
factual dispute or question that would alter the legal relationships of the parties.
The District Judge had before him all facts legally relevant to a decision and his
ruling was neither premature nor uninformed.

POINT II;

INTERVENOR, A REAL ESTATE AGENT, HAS CLAIMS ONLY

AGAINST HER BROKER FOR COMMISSIONS AND, WITH RESPECT TO THE
FUNDS HELD BY THE GARNISHEE, HAS NO CLAIM.
In her Complaint for Intervention, M. Lynne Larson essentially
argues that she is a real estate agent acting through Acres West Real Estate, that
she has commissions due from three separate transactions while acting as an agent
of Acres West Real Estate, and that, although the garnished funds remain at the title
company, she is entitled to direct payment of those funds from the title company on
the basis that those funds are her separate property and not subject to any claims
that anyone might have against her broker, Robert Law d/b/a Acres West Real
Estate. Ms. Larsons' position is contrary to Utah law.
Payment of real estate commissions is governed by Chapter 2 of
Title 61 of the Utah Code.

Section 61-2-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as

5

amended), makes very clear that a real estate agent may only be paid by the broker
and not by the title company or any other individual:
It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent to
accept valuable consideration for the performance of any
of the acts specified in this chapter from any person
except the principal broker with whom he is affiliated
and licensed.
Section 61-2-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). The "acts specified in
this chapter" include the listing and sale of real estate.
That the agent has a claim only against the broker is also evident
in from Section 61-2-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), which provides:
Actions for recovery of compensation restricted.
(1)
No person may bring or maintain an action in
any court of this state for the recovery of a commission,
fee, or compensation for any act done or service
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to other
than licensed principal brokers, unless the person was
duly licensed as a principal broker at the time of the act
or rendering the service.
(2)
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in
his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or
compensation for services as a sales agent or associate
broker unless the action is against the principal broker
with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the
recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation
may only be instituted and brought by the principal
broker with whom the sales agent or associate broker is
affiliated.
Clearly, a sales agent, such as the Intervenor in this action, is precluded from seeking
recovery for commissions earned from anyone except his or her broker.

6

Not only is the statute clear on its face, the Utah Supreme Court
has strictly construed the statute and its application. This strict construction is
apparent in both cases relied upon by Intervenor in her Brief of Appellante In
Global Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980), the Court
found a broker-agent relationship to exist between Plaintiff and a principal of an
entity (AID) which had entered into a partnership doing business as Cedar Hills
Development Company (the named Defendant). The Court began its analysis by
emphasizing that a real estate agent can, by statute sue only the broker:
[A] licensed real estate salesman has the right to
institute an action against a broker "with whom [he] is
connected" "for services as a real estate salesman," §612-18(b). The statute does not require that the salesman
be employed by such broker . . . . Plaintiffs' claim
based on the . . . transaction therefore meets the
requirements of §61-2-18.
614 P.2d at 158. The Court then found that, under the unusual facts then before it,
there was a principal-broker/sales-agent relationship between one of the Defendant's
partners and the Plaintiff agent. (Id.) The Plaintiffs recovery was allowed solely
upon that principal-broker/sales-agent relationship. The case does not recognize,
indeed it clearly denies, any direct claim on behalf of a sales/agent against the
owner.
In Global, the Utah Supreme Court determined the statute to be
controlling and its terms met by Plaintiff. The Global decision is consistent with the
Court's prior holding in Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 875 (Utah 1953), also cited by

7

Intervenor/Appellant. In Young, an agent only loosely associated with a broker,
sought to bring an action directly against a seller for commissions due. The trial
court, recognizing the inability of the agent to sue a seller directly for commissions,
joined the broker as an involuntary Plaintiff to the action and entered judgment for
the Plaintiff agent. Although Young was decided under prior law, on appeal, the
Utah Supreme Court looked to the predecessor of the current statute and stated:
The necessary implication of Section 82-2-10-that a
salesman may not sue anyone other than his employing
broker for his commission-was expressly established as
law in 1951 by a legislative addition to Title 82 which
provided that any action to recover a fee or commission
must be instituted and brought by the broker under
whom the salesman is employed. (See Section 61-2-18,
U.C.A.1953.) This same provision prohibits any person
or association from bringing an action for the recovery
of any commission for any act done, which is prohibited
under the provision of this act to other than licensed real
estate brokers, unless such persons are duly licensed
under such act as real estate broker at the time such act
or service was rendered.
259 P.2d at 878.
Although it recognized that the agent, who had in fact located the
ultimate buyer of the Defendant's property, would not be paid, the Court concluded
that the statutory mandate prevailed and equitable arguments be held inapplicable
if the statute would otherwise be abrogated. In language equally applicable to the
present case, the Court reasoned:
Doubtless plaintiff rendered some measure of service
resulting in [the buyer's] purchase of defendant's
property.
It has long been established in this
jurisdiction, however, that a broker or agent may recover

8

only by virtue of contract and cannot recover upon the
basis of quantum meruit.
259 P.2d at 877 (citations omitted.) Further, the Court went on to recognize that
with regard to commissions, the agent "was prevented by statute from having an
interest in his own right." 259 P.2d at 878. Just as in Young, Intervenor's assertion
in this case that she is the beneficial "owner" of the funds held by the title companies
is contrary to statutory law. The Utah Legislature has determined that a real estate
agent is entitled to compensation only from her broker. Her compensation is based
upon a percentage of the commission paid to the broker, but she is not entitled to
compensation directly from the seller or the title companies.

Real estate

commissions belong to the broker. It is then up to the broker to pay the agent.
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Young, supra, without the broker, the agent is
entitled to nothing.
The Utah courts have consistently recognized that pursuant to
legislative mandate, a real estate agent has a claim only against the broker for
commissions earned. The court has rejected arguments which would result in the
abrogation of Section 61-2-18(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). The
Court, too, must uphold the statute and must affirm the lower court's dismissal of
Intervenor's claim.

9

POINT III: NO RESULTING TRUST IS CREATED BY THE PRINCIPAL/AGENT
RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN INTERVENOR AND ROBERT LAW AND

INTERVENOR'S CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED.
In addition to claiming an ownership interest in the garnished funds,
Intervenor argues that the commissions held by the title companies are subject to a
resulting trust in her favor. Although a creative argument, the equitable concept of
the resulting trust, in this context, is misapplied.
The essentials of resulting trusts were concisely stated by the New
Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of Moses v. Moses, 53 A.2d 805, 40
NJ. Eq. 575 (1947):
A trust of this class arises where property is transferred
under circumstances which give rise to an inference that
the person who made the transfer or causes it to be
made does not intend the transferee to take beneficial
interest in the property; and there are properly but three
divisions of the class: (1) where an express trust fails in
whole or in part; (2) where an express trust is fully
performed without exhausting the trust res; and (3)
where the purchase price of the property is paid by one
person and at his direction the vendor conveys the
property to another person.
53 A.2d at 807. The facts of this case do not give rise to the creation of a resulting
trust. Although Intervenor provided services giving rise to the debt to the broker,
Robert Law, she did not transfer property to Robert Law or cause such property to
be transferred without Robert Law taking a beneficial interest.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in the case of Traywick v.
Wannamaker, 150 S.E. 655, 153 S.C. 146 (1929), was presented with a situation
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parallel to that presented by this case. There, a medical doctor attending to an
individual who had sustained personal injuries claimed to be the beneficiary of a
resulting trust when the person sustaining the personal injuries obtained a judgment
in a personal injury action where the medical expenses constituted an element of the
damages. The Court found the elements of a resulting trust not to be present and
it was up to the medical doctor to pursue his claims as an ordinary creditor holding:
[Tjhere is no proof of a resulting trust. Such a trust
cannot be said to be raised by implication or
construction of law, or be presumed to exist or arise, out
of the transaction touching the parties involved in this
litigation; and there is no fact connected with the case
which establishes, or tends to establish, a resulting trust.
There is no proof that Wannamaker was placed in a
fiduciary position with regard to the fund involved, or
that he in any way practiced a fraud on the litigants
involved in the case, or that he gained any advantage
over them, which would tend to establish a trust relation.
150 S.E.2d at 660. Intervenor stands in the same position with regard to the funds
at issue as the physician with regard to the funds paid pursuant to the personal injury
judgment.
Intervenor essentially asks this Court to create a non-possessory lien
on all monies due a principal or employer for payment of commissions or salary to
an agent or employee. That is not the law. An employee does not have a lien on
an employer's accounts receivable unless a judgment has previously been entered in
favor of the employee and the employee has levied execution. Nor does an agent
have a lien on the principal's accounts receivable. In the context of real estate

11

agents, such a lien would be contrary to Section 61-2-18(2) because to foreclose such
a lien would necessitate filing suit, which action is specifically precluded.
An agent's rights are not determined by the law of trusts, but rather
y the specific statutes previously relied upon herein and by the law of agency. Any
lien an agent may have in this context is limited only to a possessory lien for
reimbursement or compensation.1

lr

The general rule as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, §464
provides:
When Agent Has Lien
(a) an agent has a right to retain possession of
money, goods, or documents of the principal, of which
he has gained possession in the proper execution of his
agency, until he is paid the amount due him from the
principal as compensation for services performed or as
indemnity for money advanced or liability incurred by
him in connection with such things;
(b) a factor, banker, or attorney°at-law has the
further right to retain possession of money, goods, or
documents until he is paid the amount due him upon the
general balance of accounts created by transactions
conducted by him as such factor, banker, or attorney;
(c) a factor who has made advances or incurred
liability with respect to goods received by him for sale
has a right to sell them contrary to directions of the
principal, after notice to the principal, if the reasonable
protection of the factor's interest so requires;
(d) an agent to whom goods have been consigned but
not received, and who advances money in anticipation of
their receipt, has a right to their possession and
thereafter, under the circumstances stated in Clauses (a),
(b), and (c), to the rights therein stated; and
12

In Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), our Supreme
Court rejected equitable arguments where they are contrary to a clear statutory
mandate. In the context of this case, the funds held by the title companies belong
to the broker. The agent can sue the broker for her commission, as in the case of
Global Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2d 105 (Utah 1980), but she can
sue neither the seller nor the title company. Because the agent, Intervener herein,
cannot sue, she has no legal claim to the funds and she is simply a creditor of her
broker in line to be paid. This was the conclusion of the District Court in this case
and the dismissal of Appellant's Amended Complaint in Intervention must be
affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The District Court had before it, as undisputed, all facts legally
relevant to a decision regarding the validity of the Intervenor's claims to the funds
at issue. The trial judge appropriately ruled that a real estate agent, in the absence
of the broker's insolvency and the pendency of a bankruptcy petition, stands in line
with other creditors claiming entitlement to garnishable assets of the broker. The
funds at issue are in the hands of title companies.

Intervenor can make no

(e) an attorney of record who has obtained a
judgment has an interest therein, as security for his fees
in the case and for proper payments made and liabilities
incurred during the course of the proceedings.
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possessory claim nor does she have a judgment against the broker upon which she
has levied execution. Given the facts already asserted by Intervenor, there is no
additional proof Intervener could make which would change the legal relationship
of the parties. Based upon the undisputed facts, the statutes recited above, and the
law of agency, this Court must affirm the decision of the District Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^O^dav of May, 1989.
PARKEN & KECK

By

^Wcut^itu-C,

Marcella L. Keck
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

Original Signature
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ELDON A. ELIASON
Attorney for Defendant
Box 605
Delta, Utah 84624
864-2515
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CARRIE JO LAW SIDDIQI,
Plaintiff,

A F F I D A V I T

vs.
Civil

No.

7860

ROBERT FRANK LAW
Defendint
STATE OF UTAH

I

COUNTY OF MILLARD

)
)

ss

M. Lynne Larson, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes
and says that she is a real estate agent working for and with
Acres West and has been so engaged for two years.

M. Lynne Larson

listed and sold tne property which closed on the 21st of June
1983. referred to as Sannes .ChemExec property.
agent is tonally

i hat she as sales

-responsible for the sale and listing ot the said

orouertv ana as a resjit thereof has a commission and an expense
f-cm the proceeds being held by Utah Title Comoany.
That Carrie Jo Law Siddiqi has filed a Writ ot Garnishment
against the said funds, none of whicn belongs to \cres
$468, the balance

West except

to M. Lynne Larson, OF $702.00

Dated June 30, 1988.

*

•

, /?

/•;

TT. L/mie Larson'
v

Subscribed and sworn to before me tnis 30ih day o,c June, 198«
V

\^:_J./

1
2

BBB0CT3I

WC--07

3
4

6

W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (A2170)
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS
Attorneys for Intervenor
930 South State Street, Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84058

7

Telephone:

5

(801) 224-2119

8

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY

9

STATE OF UTAH

10

oooOooo

11

CARRIE JO LAW,

12
13
14

VSc

ROBERT FRANK LAW,
Defendant,

15
16

M. LYNNE LARSON,
Civil No. 7860
Intervenor.

17

oooOooo

18
19
20
21

COMES NOW the Intervenor in the above-entitled action who
complains of Plaintiff and for causes of action alleges as
follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

22
23
24
25
26

AMENDED
COMPLAINT IN
INTERVENTION

Plaintiff,

1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were previously husband and wife,

and are now divorced.
2.

Intervenor is a licensed real estate sales associate

affiliated with Acres West Real Estate, a real estate agency owned

27
28
in*
iSm»St

A-l

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
iiiou0n« Jonts,

by Defendant herein, as Real Estate Broker.
3.

Over the last several months, Intervenor has listed and

sold three properties for which Security Title Company of Millard
County and/or Utah Title Company has handled the title work and
closings.
4.

That she is due, from the funds held by Security Title

and/or Utah Title, commissions as follows: from transaction no.
87EM026, the sum of $742.50, from transaction no. 88EM023, the sum
of $486.00 and from transaction no. 88EM028, the sum of $1140.00.
5.

On or about June 21, 1988 Plaintiff caused to be served

upon Security Title of Millard County and Utah Title writs of
garnishment in an attempt to garnish funds due from Security Title
of Millard County and Utah Title to Defendant herein.
6.

Plaintiff has claimed, through various motions filed with

this Court, and claims made with Security Title of Millard County
and Utah Title, that she is due all sums to be paid by Security
Title of Millard County and/or Utah Title to Acres West Real
Estate Agency, including those amounts due to Intervenor as a
result of listing and/or sales of real estate.
7.

The commissions due to Intervenor as aforesaid are the

sole property of Intervenor and are not subject to garnishment or
execution

by Plaintiff

creditor of Defendant.

or any other person claiming

to be a

1
2
3
4
5

8.

Intervenor is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the

6

commissions earned by her are her own separate property and not

7

subject to the claims of any other party hereto.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

8
9
10
11

1. Intervenor re-alleges paragraphs 1-8 of her first cause of
action as though they were fully set forth herein.
2.

Acres West Realty, in addition to its business of selling

12

homes, acts as a rental agent for certain rental properties in the

13

Millard

14

landlords.

15

3.

County

area,

which properties are owned

by

absentee

Intervenor is due, as the leasing agent on certain of

16

those properties, the sum of $608.41, which amount was due and

17

payable from Defendant's general account in his bank.

18
19
20
21
22
23

4.

against Defendant's bank, holding his general account, including
the amounts owed to intervenor.
5.

26
27
28
Vim
ft State St

Intervenor is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the

commissions earned by her are her own separate property and not
subject to the claims of any other party hereto,
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

24
25

Plaintiff has caused a writ of garnishment to be issued

1.

Intervenor re-alleges paragraphs 1-8 of her first cause of

action and 1-5 of her second cause of action as though fully set

1
2
3
4
forth herein.
5
2.

Defendant

herein,

by operation of law,

is a de facto

6
trustee, and Intervenor is a de facto beneficiary, of a resulting
7
trust whereby Defendant has come in to certain property conveyed
8
to him as the result of the efforts of Intervenor.
9
3.
10
11
12

Because of the resulting trust, the amounts claimed by

Intervenor

herein

as set forth above,

are sole and

separate

property of Intervenor and are not subject to the garnishment or
other execution actions of Plaintiff herein

13
WHEREFORE, Intervenor prays judgment as follows:
14
1.

For a declaratory judgment that funds due to her as earned

15
commissions as a sales associate with Acres West Real Estate are
16
her own

personal

property

and

not

subject

to

garnishment

or

17
execution by either Plaintiff or Defendant herein.
18
2.

For an order of this Court directing Plaintiff to cease

19
and desist from her efforts to garnish or execute on commissions
20
due to Intervenor.
21
3.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
utlough, Jonas,
A. K i l n .

For a declaratory judgment that Intervenor is owed the sum

of $2368.50 as commissions from transactions 87EM026, 88EM023 and
88EM028 and that such sums are due and payable upon closing of
those transactions.
4.

For declaratory judgment that Intervenor is owed the sum

of $608.41 as rental commissions as rental agent: for absentee

1
2
3
4
5
6

landlords.
5.

For a d e c l a r a t i o n of a r e s u l t i n g

7

I n t e r v e n o r as a r e s u l t

8

funds

9

Plaintiff

10

6.

11
12
13

held

of h e r own l a b o r and an e x e m p t i o n of

by D e f e n d a n t

in

such

t o e x e c u t e on D e f e n d a n t ' s

For

such

other

'J-O

V

a trust

from

any

actions

relief

as

the

Court

premises.

day of O c t o b e r ,

1988.

MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ugh, Jonas,
Mm
rth Stats St

any
by

property.

and f u r t h e r

e q u i t a b l e and proper i n t h e
DATED t h i s

t r u s t upon any monies due

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Intervenor

/
/

deems

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby c e r t i f y
mail

t h a t on t h e

day o f O c t o b e r ,

1988, I did

a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e above and f o r e g o i n g

in I n t e r v e n t i o n ,
for P l a i n t i f f ,

p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o M a r c e l l a L. Keck,

Delta,

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
lough, Jon**,
ItMftt

Attorney

Utah

Attorney for Defendant,

P.O. Box

84620.

11
12

Complaint

9 E x c h a n g e P l a c e , S u i t e 8 0 8 , S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h

8 4 1 1 1 and t o E l d o n A. E l i a s o n ,
605,

%rf

/

/Jl

